Special Report: German Funding to Croatian Border Enforcement

This report by the Border Violence Monitoring Network (BVMN), with the support of PRO ASYL, summarizes the results of an investigation into the support of German authorities for Croatian border authorities from 2016-2021 (and for deployments of officers, until 2022). It sheds a light on donations of equipment, the deployment of officers, and further kinds of support. In addition, the organisation of the Croatian police with regard to pushback operations is discussed.

On both political and practical levels, Germany has heavily supported Croatia in border enforcement and securitization efforts. This support has continued over the last several years despite overwhelming evidence of systemic human rights violations perpetrated by Croatian police forces against people-on-the-move (POM).

From 2016 until the 1st quarter of 2021, at least 24 German officers were deployed in Croatia as liaison officers in different capacities, in addition to those working for the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex). In the same period, the total sum of the vehicle and equipment donations (including thermal cameras and other surveillance technology, as well as non-border related topics) amounted to €2,862,851.36. German institutions further conducted at least 87 trainings, official visits, or evaluations of Croatian police forces, on topics ranging from prevention, the use of police dogs, border management, and surveillance. The sum of the cost of the trainings in the period 2016 – 2021 calculated is €422,168.84.

Of particular concern is the heavy involvement and provision of equipment by German institutions to the Intervention Police, which among other sectors of the Croatian police, has been identified as a key actor in systematic pushbacks along Croatian borders. In total, the Intervention Police received €158,171.98 in equipment donations and €47,539.92 in trainings from 2016-2021. A further €321,527.70 was provided specifically to the Special Police.

The extent of the systematic violent pushbacks along the Croatian border and the structures behind them suggest that equipment provided by Germany could also be connected to pushbacks along the Croatian border that violate international law.

BVMN Statement on Czech Officers’ Involvement in Fundamental Rights Violations

Border Violence Monitoring Network (BVMN) has requested the initiation of an investigation into potential human rights violations perpetrated by Czech officers deployed in Hungary and in North Macedonia. BVMN recorded instances of pushbacks and violence that could amount to torture or inhuman and degrading treatment in violation of Article 4 EU Charter and Article 3 ECHR. Czechia currently holds the Presidency of the Council of the European Union while not being compliant with European Union Law including the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.

Since 2020, BVMN has recorded accounts from people on the move who have been intercepted and apprehended in Hungary and North Macedonia and pushed back to Serbia and Greece respectively, without due process. People on the move have reported that Czech officers perpetrated violence against them that would amount to inhuman and degrading treatment or torture. Also, Czech officers have potentially assisted in human rights violations by apprehending people on the move and handing them over to national authorities with knowledge that people would be pushed back, or witnessed as violence was perpetrated against people, behaviour that might amount to aiding and abetting torture or inhuman and degrading treatment.

See the visual investigation into pushbacks involving Czech officers at the Greek-North Macedonian Border


The Guidelines rest upon and repeatedly stress the importance of the Special Procedures of the UN Commission on Human Rights (OHCHR), including the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders and commit to use outputs and reporting from these Special Procedures to guide their own actions on protection for HRDs. The current Special Rapporteur, Mary Lawlor, in her first report in 2020, outlines migrants rights defenders (MRDs) as an area of priority for the duration of her mandate due to the high level of exposure to violent attacks and human rights violations that they have been faced with. In concordance with this, the first communication she issued in her position was to the Government of Greece regarding the detention of a MRD and the intimidation and criminalisation of NGOs working to provide humanitarian aid on the Greek islands. Mary Lawlor’s most recent report, ‘Refusing to turn away: human rights defenders working on the rights of refugees, migrants and asylum-seekers’, again brings into focus the situation of MRDs particularly in EU Member States (MS).

In spite of the repeated prioritisation of MRDs in EU MS under Mary Lawlor’s mandate, including in her recent country visit to Greece6, the Guidelines at the EU level retain a focus on HRDs outside of the bloc. All the provisions laid out in the Guidelines refer to actions that can be taken in third countries by EU Missions, Delegations and MS representatives. There is still no protection mechanism for HRDs working on the territories of EU MS, except for those outlined with reference to transnational attacks against Third Country National (TCN) HRDs who are residing on EU territory but still subject to reprisals by their home States.

BVMN puts forward the position that HRDs acting on the territory of EU MS must also be granted protection at an EU level and have access to the protection mechanisms presented in the Guidelines for HRDs from third countries. This should be done with a particular emphasis on MRDs working within EU MS.

Policy Brief: Criminalization of POM

In recent years, securitisation discourses have shifted the framing of migration as a human rights issue bound up with Cold War politics, to an issue of criminality and the fight against transnational organised crime. This has, in turn, led to an increasing overlap between criminal law and migration management at the transnational level in the European Union (EU) which is reflected by the increase in legislation governing the movement of people. Nothing reflects this phenomenon more clearly than the cases of strategic litigation brought against people-on-the-move (POM), and the lengthy prison sentences that accompany them. The criminalisation of movement in general has been in the focus of the Border Violence Monitoring Network’s (BVMN) advocacy work since its conception in 2017.

When analysing the relevant policy documents provided in the timeline above, there is a clear distinction between international human rights instruments at the UN level, and the ways in which such rights are provided for in EU legislation. In 2000 when the UN established the Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime, ratified by all EU Member States (MS), there was a clear emphasis on dividing the definitions and charges of ‘smuggling’ and ‘trafficking’ through the establishment of two separate protocols. Furthermore, the former protocol clearly outlined the rights of POM being smuggled and prohibited the criminalisation of individuals who were subject to smuggling. At the EU level, the distinctions between smuggling, trafficking, and illegal migration are ill-defined. The creation of an internal free market and free movement as put forth by the Schengen acquis required, inter alia, a commitment to strengthening the EU’s external borders as a means of protecting the internal body of MS. In fact, the offence of facilitation of illegal entry is first mentioned in Article 7 (1) of the Schengen Convention (1990). In 2002, the Facilitator’s Package furthered this agenda by putting forward the goal of the Commission to combat both illegal migration and the aiding of illegal migration. The package even stands in direct contradiction to the UN definition of smuggling; it doesn’t consider financial gain as intrinsic to this definition, simply an aggravating circumstance. Again, the mechanisms behind this are somewhat blurred with the terms used in the policy document such as ‘smuggling’, ‘financial gain’, and ‘humanitarian assistance’ left open and undefined, with full discretion being left to MS to decide how sanctions are transposed into national legislation (Article 3).