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BVMN is a collaborative project between multiple grassroots organisations and NGOs working along the Western Balkan Route and Greece, documenting violations at borders directed towards people-on-the-move. The partners have a common website database, used as a platform to collate testimonies of illegal pushbacks which are gathered through interviews.

The methodological process for these interviews leverages the close social contact that we have as independent volunteers with refugees and migrants to monitor pushbacks at multiple borders. When individuals return with significant injuries or stories of abuse, one of our violence reporting volunteers will sit down with them to collect their testimony. Although the testimony collection itself is typically with a group no larger than five persons, the pushback groups which they represent can exceed 50 persons. We have a standardised framework for our interview structure which blends the collection of hard data (dates, geo-locations, officer descriptions, photos of injuries/medical reports, etc.) with open narratives of the abuse.

The term pushback is a key component of the situation that unfolded along the EU borders (Hungary and Croatia) with Serbia in 2016, after the closure of the Balkan Route. Pushback describes the informal expulsion (without due process) of an individual or group to another country. This lies in contrast to the term “deportation”, which is conducted in a legal framework. Pushbacks have become an important, if unofficial, part of the migration regime of EU countries and elsewhere.

BiH – Bosnia and Herzegovina
HRV – Croatia
SRB – Serbia
SLO – Slovenia
ROM – Romania
HUN – Hungary
AUT – Austria
MNK – North Macedonia
GRC – Greece
BGR – Bulgaria
TUR – Turkey
EU – European Union
In March, the Border Violence Monitoring Network (BVMN)\(^1\) shared 36 testimonies of pushbacks impacting 762 people-on-the-move across the Balkans. This report brings together first-hand testimonies from a range of countries in the region to look at the way European Union states and other actors are affecting systemic violence towards people crossing borders. In trends in pushbacks observed in the last month, this report analyses the continuation of pushbacks perpetrated deep inland in Greece of people-on-the-move with some kind of legal status and official documentation.

In sharing updates from the different BVMN field bases throughout the region, this report delves into violence and discrimination at the Velečevo Checkpoint in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the work of local red cross volunteers active in the area. A section on Serbia highlights recent far-right actions near migrant squats near Subotica. On the 27th of March the Serbian far-right ant-migrant group Narodne Patrole (People’s Patrol) searched for, chased, and verbally harassed migrants residing in squats around the railway lines in the centre of Subotica, before stealing their belongings and handing them over to the police. These actions also coincided with an extended period of continuous police evictions in the squats in Subotica, which has caused the population sleeping rough in the centre of town to fall to almost zero in the two weeks following.

In Greece, an application in interim measures to the European Court of Human Rights was submitted on the behalf of 34 persons left stranded on an islet in the Evros river by Greek authorities during a pushback. The application was granted and the Court requested “that the applicants should not be removed until 14 April 2022, included, and to provide the applicants with food, water, clothing, temporary shelter and adequate medical care until 14 April 2022”. On April 1st, the group was rescued by the authorities and transferred to Fylakio reception and identification centre. The report also touches on several updates from Samos, as well as recent police operations in Athens leading to the detention of hundreds of people-on-the-move.

Trieste, one of the main transit hubs for people-on-the-move travelling from Croatia through Slovenia and into Italy, saw a slight increase in people-on-the-move arriving in the city in the last month. However, solidarians active in the city note worrying political and operational developments regarding the reception of people-on-the-move from the global south, in contrast to those fleeing the recent conflict in Ukraine. Most notably, Massimo Fedriga, of the rightwing party Lega, asserted that “while accepting Ukrainian refugees is possible, [the system cannot manage] arrivals from the Balkan and Mediterranean Routes”, yet failing to provide data to prove his stance. The report concludes with a brief update from the Polish-Ukrainian border region and the ongoing war in Ukraine.

\(^1\) BVMN is a network of watchdog organisations active in Greece and the Western Balkans including No Name Kitchen, Rigardu, AreYouSyrious, MobileInfoTeam, Push-back Alarm Austria Josoor, InfoKolpa, Centre for Peace Studies, BlindSpots, Mare Liberum, Collective Aid, and Fresh Response.
In March, volunteers of one of BVMN’s anonymous partner organisations and Aid Brigade Sarajevo collected two testimonies (4.1 and 4.4) where the respondents recounted their apprehensions Greece and subsequent pushbacks in the Evros/Meriç River border area. Their testimonies describe how pushbacks are occurring from deep into mainland Greece and include people-on-the-move who are in possession of an Asylum Seeker’s Card (ASC, often referred to as a “White Card” or “Ausweis”).

The first respondent described he was travelling by bus from Kavala to Thessaloniki when the bus stopped and five male officers came up to the bus where they apprehended the respondent with four others. The respondent showed the officers his ASC and UNHCR cash card upon which the officers destroyed both cards. He was taken to an informal detention centre or police/army station reportedly close to the GRC-TUR border.

“I was talking to them really kindly that I have asylum, but they didn’t listen to me. I was trying to speak to them in English, German, they didn’t respond. They just beat me.” The respondent was pushed back in a group of around 100 people to Turkey at the Evros/Meriç border area.

The second respondent received asylum in Greece in 2017 and has been working in Thessaloniki for the past 5 years. He was apprehended when driving two friends from Alexandroupoli to Thessaloniki. He explained he did not bring his documentation with him as he knew there was a chance he would be checked. He was taken to a detention centre that did not have any indication of being a police station nor having any signs. “I didn't have to ask for asylum because I already have a permit. I told them that everywhere. In response they kicked, slapped and really humiliated me.” After being detained for two days, he was pushed back to Turkey in a group of 70 people at the Evros/Meriç border area.

Both of these incidents are very similar to what was described in the BVMN monthly report of October 2020, and to testimonies reported by The New Humanitarian and Amnesty International: authorities apprehend large groups of people-on-the-move from deep into the mainland, they are brought to either formal or informal detention centres where their belongings are taken. They often reportedly experience violence from the authorities and are pushed back at the Evros/Meriç River. These incidents speak to the systematic nature of illegal pushbacks in Greece: the complicity of police departments and units throughout the country, and persistent human rights violations perpetrated by Greek authorities against people-on-the-move long after they first enter Greek territory.
Every day the police continue to stop buses at Velečeo Checkpoint on the internal border of Republika Srpska and The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Last month at the checkpoint, a small Red Cross team assisted people-on-the-move stranded 100 kilometers from their destination.

In the last years, thousands of people-on-the-move have transited through Bosnia towards Western Europe. They travel by bus from Sarajevo to the northwest of Bosnia, to towns like Bihać and Velika Kladusha, before attempting to cross into Croatia. In 2018, the government of Bihać created the Velečeo checkpoint, near Kljuć, at the entrance of Una Sana Canton. This effort to control the migratory flow of people was designed to prevent people from reaching the border. Six buses pass through each day and the Una Sana Canton police systematically stop each one, racially profile passengers on the bus and ask for their passports. All people without papers are forced to get off the bus.

Last month, 345 single men, 7 single women, 80 minors, and 43 families were stopped at the Velečeo Checkpoint. One local volunteer there supporting people-on-the-move reported seeing mothers carry crying babies off the bus while trying to also keep their 2-year-old close. Families and vulnerable people were taken to the camp in Borici, Bihać. Single men, on the other hand, had no choice but to walk or try to get a taxi. The majority of people removed at the
checkpoint last month were single men from Afghanistan and Pakistan. Increasingly, more single men from West African countries, including Sierra Leone, Gambia, Ghana, and Burkina Faso, are stopped. Last month, the first families from Pakistan and Burkina Faso were apprehended at the checkpoints well as 17 families from Cuba.

While the overall number of people–on–the–move staying in Una Sana is significantly lower compared to previous years, people continue to be stopped at the Velečevo Checkpoint every day. In 2021, 8,160 people were stopped at this checkpoint. Six thousand of these were single men, 497 were minors, and 359 families were removed. One NGO worker operating there described hearing daily reports of violence and pushbacks from the border, but emphasized that the situation is usually calm when people are removed from the bus, with people seeming quite disoriented:

ʻThey are confused. Some people didn’t know this would happen. I mean, I would be confused because this is really something else. I also understand because they paid a 35 BAM or more ticket.’

When the checkpoint was implemented in 2018, little support was available for those kicked off the busses, and many slept rough or in a make–shift camp nearby. A local Red Cross project was created soon after to respond to the needs of those stranded, equipped with container for first aid and one for food and non–food items, as well as a cabin for people to sleep in.

People have stayed as long as a week and can get food and clothes, depending on the resources of the team there.

Velečevo Checkpoint represents yet another obstacle for people who have already made long and dangerous journeys. It is one of many measures that restrict the freedom of movement of people–on–the–move. The police checkpoint is a snapshot of the migratory flow of people in Bosnia: an unexpected stop along the Balkan Route, where it is unclear what will happen next.

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SERBIA

FAR–RIGHT PEOPLE’S PATROL ACTIVITIES AT THE SQUATS IN SUBOTICA

On the 27th of March the Serbian far–right ant–migrant group Narodne Patrole (People’s Patrol) searched for, chased, and verbally harassed migrants residing in squats around the railway lines in the centre of Subotica, before ‘recovering’ left–behind phones, weapons, and passports and handing them over to the police. The ‘protest’, which was live streamed and published alongside sympathetic commentary on local media outlets did not escalate beyond verbal altercations with the local police also present. The action was called in response to an alleged rape of a local in Subotica, which members of the group characterised as part of a larger spike in crimes conducted against locals by migrants. The action also coincided with an extended period of continuous police evictions in the squats in Subotica, which has caused the population sleeping rough in the centre of town to fall to almost zero in the two weeks following.
On the evening of March 30, a group of 34 Syrians reached out to BVMN and multiple other civil society organisations to be rescued and allowed to access asylum in Greece. The group was stranded on an uninhabited islet in the Evros river, at the Greek–Turkish land border. BVMN alerted the authorities, Frontex, and Greek national human rights institutions.

In the absence of a quick response to search and rescue the group, an application in interim measures to the European Court of Human Rights was submitted on the behalf of the 34 persons. The application was granted and the Court requested “that the applicants should not be removed until 14 April 2022, included, and to provide the applicants with food, water, clothing, temporary shelter and adequate medical care until 14 April 2022”. On April 1st, the group was rescued by the authorities and transferred to Fylakio reception and identification centre.

Like at other European borders, accessing the territory and lodging an asylum application in Greece has become largely unattainable. For this reason, asylum seekers supported by legal aid organisations look more often to international tribunals for remedies such as the European Court of Human Rights to oblige Greece to comply with its human rights obligations. This illustrates that protection from pushbacks and access to asylum without the support of a court has become a near impossibility. However, it is unacceptable that this has become the norm in Greece, as a European Member State, and a signatory to the European Convention of Human Rights and many other international human rights instruments.

On the 7th March, the Greek Council for refugees (GCR) and Oxfam published a report about the new Closed Controlled Access Centre (C.C.A.C.) on Samos. The organisations reveal that approximately 1 in 5 people are detained for two months, even though a Greek court declared in December that the de facto detention of asylum seekers is illegal. Nonetheless testimonies gathered by GCR and Oxfam reveal...
that asylum seekers are continually being detained against this court ruling. Besides that, the report exposes the use of “revenge tactics” by authorities in response to NGO reports, media coverage and legal action by asylum seekers regarding illegal detention. Finally, it highlights the excessive surveillance used inside the camp premises.

PREGNANT WOMAN SEEKING ASYLUM LOSING HER CHILD IN SAMOS

On the 9th March, the newspaper efsyn published an article about a woman seeking asylum that was a victim of illegal detention despite being heavily pregnant. She was part of a group of refugees that landed on the island a few days earlier; the initial group hid from the competent authorities over fears of being pushed back to Turkey. When locals outside of Vathy, the capital of the island, saw her in bad condition, they called an ambulance hoping she would be taken care of. However the ambulance never arrived and she ‘disappeared’ for a few hours before being taken to the C.C.A.C. where people eventually realised the gravity of the situation.

Tragically it was too late for her unborn baby and the doctors had to remove the foetus to save her.

PUBLICATION OF EU CORRESPONDENCE

A correspondence between the Samos Advocacy Collective and the European Commission on current movement restrictions of camp residents in the C.C.A.C. in Samos has been made public. Having sent letters on the 30th November and the 9th December to ask competent authorities about the ‘legal basis’ of these restrictions, Deputy Director General of the “Task Force Migration Management” of the EU Commission, Beate Gminder, eventually replied but showed clear signs of disregard of their accountability for the situation and offered ‘solutions’ that are not applicable to the two groups of camp residents mentioned in the letters.

ATHENS AND THESSALONIKI POLICE OPERATIONS

In mid-March, police in Athens began carrying out a series of actions in predominantly migrant neighborhoods of the city center, engaging in racial profiling to stop people on the streets, check their papers, and then arrest them if the person was found to be undocumented. Hundreds were arrested and later transported to detention centres. The “sweeps” occurred mainly in the neighborhoods of Viktoria, Omonia, Monastiraki and later Kato Patisia: all neighborhoods with large working class and migrant populations. In some instances, entire blocks were cordoned off by police, who then systematically harassed and in many cases arrested those present.
In Viktoria, police actions were met with \textit{resistance from local collectives} and residents of the neighborhood, who took to the streets with banners and shouted slogans in solidarity with migrants, as well as against police brutality and systemic racism. Many people were arrested, including a journalist who was present in an official capacity. Threats and violence towards the protestors continued after they had been apprehended, with some of the women arrested reporting that threats of rape were used against members of the group. Later that night at a solidarity gathering outside the police headquarters, solidarians were again attacked by the police, who attempted to break up the gathering.

Sweeps continued over the next days, with police actions in Omonia, Viktoria, Monastiraki, and Kato Patisia. Within broader developments relating to migration and asylum in Greece, these police actions can be seen as connected to the lack of access to asylum since November 2021, and the ongoing normalisation and expanded use of detention. The online asylum registration system previously used by those seeking asylum in mainland Greece was shut down in November 2022. In effect, this has meant little to know access to applying for asylum on a structural level for many asylum seekers arriving in Greece in the last months. Since the passing of the IPA in 2020, we have witnessed the expanded use and normalisation of migrant detention through the extension of how long a person can be held in detention from 18 months to 36 months including deportation procedures, to the implementation of new surveillance systems, walls, and restrictions on mobility within official camps. For those who reach urban centres in mainland Greece, going to the Fylakio RIC—mere kilometres from the Greek/Turkish Border, from which people have been pushed back to Turkey in the past—may seem like an inviable option. All of these factors leave recent arrivals in an impossible position: people arrive wanting to follow legal pathways and apply for asylum in Greece, but are unable to do so due to structural issues making this nearly impossible. Without proper documentation, asylum seekers are cut off from state support services, and at risk of incarceration if stopped by police. Many wind up in cities, where it is somehow easier to survive, even without access to state support. The police then organise massive operations in predominantly migrant neighbourhoods in cities, and arrest all of those found to be without documents. The cyclical nature of state violence against people on the move, and the incredible difficulty to break out of these seemingly unending loops of structural inequalities, bureaucratic nightmares, rising incarceration and police brutality raise heavy concerns as to how the situation will develop from here.
In March 2022, NGOs, collectives, and individuals that operate in Piazza Libertà (Trieste) have noticed a slight increase in the arrivals of people-on-the-move. 218 people (192 adults, 22 unaccompanied minors and two couples coming from India) made it to the city center, up from 110 of the previous month.

Following the Russian invasion in Ukraine, there has been a noticeable shift in the political agenda of policymakers, as well as in the operations of the local reception system. Casa Malala, a structure that previously housed people coming from the Balkan Route, has been emptied to make space for the arrival of people from Ukraine. Pierpaolo Roberti, regional councilor for immigration, promoted a new law aimed at further decreasing arrivals and strengthening assisted returns. Most notably, Massimo Fedriga, of the rightwing party Lega, asserted that “while accepting Ukrainian refugees is possible, [the system cannot manage] arrivals from the Balkan and Mediterranean Routes”, yet failing to provide data to prove his stance. Nevertheless, there is a growing fear present of a hierarchization of people-on-the-move based on ethnicity and the broader political scenario (e.g. propaganda, war rhetoric, fear-mongering).

To a certain degree, double standards are already emerging regarding the treatment of refugees travelling Balkan and Mediterranean routes, and those arriving from Ukraine. While every person crossing the border is mandated to quarantine for 6 days, people fleeing Ukraine can do so in specialized centers (there are 4 of them in Trieste at the moment). All other nationalities (predominantly people from Pakistan and Afghanistan) are sent to Campo Sacro, which presents considerably worse living conditions. Since there are 40 to 50 people present there, it can be concluded that the Italian police still chases and leads them back when they decide to resume their journeys. Of particular concern is the case of two Pakistani people who fled Ukraine, where they had obtained their residency permits, but were conducted to Campo Sacro regardless.

Over a month after the outbreak of war in Ukraine, the situation on the Polish/Ukrainian border remains somewhat turbulent. In total, it is estimated over 4 million people have fled the conflict, with 2,293,833 people arriving in Poland. While the number of people crossing the border the last days has slowed to the lowest numbers since the beginning of the war, 142,300 people crossed on Sunday (27th of March), and the UN has described the exodus from Ukraine as the fastest-growing refugee crisis in
Europe since the second world war. As Russian troops withdraw from some areas, and humanitarian corridors have been established in the last days from places such as Mariupol, it is possible that the number of people trying to cross borders to leave Ukraine may increase again. Further, it is important to note that at least in part, the ability for people to leave impacted areas somewhat immediately after the war started is also a question of economic standing: many of those who were able to flee first had the means to do so, could pick up and leave with little difficulty, or the connections to find work or accommodation. For working class and poor people, the elderly, people of color, Roma families, and other groups facing systemic discrimination on both sides of the border, social and economic barriers in place have made it much more difficult.

At the border, people wait for hours in the cold to cross. Many then wait in train stations and reception centres throughout the region to arrange transportation to other destinations in Poland and neighbouring countries. While the reception of (white) Ukrainian refugees has been quite positive in Poland as the society mobilised to organise humanitarian aid, food, accommodation, and rides to destinations all over Poland (and Europe), the reception of refugees from the global south, and of Roma people has been much less positive in moments: with people being blocked from entering Poland, harassed and beaten in some instances. While a vast network of NGOs providing basic services, and official reception centers has sprung up to support those in the border region, these services are sometimes not available to undocumented people. At least 15 people remain detained on the Ukrainian side of the border for trying to cross.

In the long run, UN high commissioner for refugees Filippo Grandi has warned that growing numbers of refugees would put pressure on governments throughout the region, hinting at potential shifts in approaches to reception down the line. This however remains to be seen, and many of those fleeing the war speak of returning to Ukraine once the violence subsides.

On the Ukrainian side, the border city of Lviv—a frequent destination for many of those displaced that has up until now been regarded as relatively safe—was hit by a rocket attack in the last weeks. Broadly speaking, the situation largely remains unclear as to how things will go in the next weeks as attacks continue on Mariupol and other cities in the East. Attacks on civilian infrastructure and prevention/apprehension of people fleeing the war by Russian forces have also posed severe risks to those seeking safety. Sexual violence, including rape of civilians, has been increasingly reported perpetrated by Russian soldiers, and with that the need for specialized care for refugees reaching western Ukraine and eastern Poland.
<table>
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<td>18th March</td>
<td>Syria</td>
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**Hungary To Serbia**

| 2.1  | 2nd March | 12th March  | Congo, Senegal, Gambia, Pakistan   | 20         |
| 2.2  | 15th January | 26th March | Afghanistan, Kurdistan, Morocco, Pakistan | 12 |

**Slovenia To Bosnia-Herzegovina**

| 3.1  | 13rd February | 26nd February | Algeria                           | 4          |
| 3.2  | 19th February | 22nd February | Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq            | 8          |
| 3.3  | 25th February | 1st March    | Afghanistan                        | 3          |
| 3.4  | 28th February | 23rd March   | Afghanistan                        | 3          |
| 3.5  | 1st March    | 4th March    | Algeria                           | 1          |
| 3.6  | 2nd March    | 3rd March    | Afghanistan, Iran, Kurdistan      | 8          |
| 3.7  | 1st March    | 12th March   | Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Mali        | 8          |
| 3.8  | 2nd March    | 3rd March    | Iran, Iraq, Cuba                   | 15         |
| 3.9  | 3rd March    | 14th March   | Pakistan                           | 5          |
| 3.10 | 5th March    | 15th March   | Bangladesh                         | 4          |
| 3.11 | 6th March    | 9th March    | Cuba, Bolivia                      | 20         |
| 3.12 | 9th March    | 10th March   | Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkey      | 4          |
| 3.13 | 11th March   | 14th March   | Afghanistan, Pakistan, India       | 50         |
| 3.14 | 18th March   | 23rd March   | Burkina Faso, Côte D'Ivoire        | 6          |
| 3.15 | 19th March   | 22nd March   | India, Pakistan                    | 4          |
| 3.16 | 22nd March   | 23rd March   | Afghanistan, Iran                  | 4          |
| 3.17 | 22nd March   | 9th April    | Afghanistan                        | 1          |

**Croatia To Bosnia-Herzegovina**

| 4.1  | 21st October | 28th March | Syria, Iraq, Morocco, Algeria, Libya | 100         |
| 4.2  | 24th November | 7th March | Afghanistan, Syria, Morocco, Algeria | 80          |
| 4.3  | 1st March    | 2nd March  | Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Morocco, Egypt | 75         |
| 4.4  | 2nd March    | 4th March  | Afghanistan, Syria, Morocco, Algeria, Somalia, Libya | 70 |
| 4.5  | 13th March   | 14th March | Syria, Iraq, Morocco, Algeria, Yemen | 60          |
| 4.6  | 15th March   | 16th March | Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, Morocco, Somalia | 80         |
| 4.7  | 21st March   | 22nd March | Afghanistan, Syria, Morocco, Algeria | 36          |
| 4.8  | 21st March   | 23rd March | Bangladesh, Palestine, Syria, Iraq  | 40          |
| 4.9  | 22nd March   | 22nd March | Morocco                            | 3           |

**Greece To Turkey**

| 5.1  | 10th March | 11th March | Syria                                  | 3           |
| 5.2  | 11th March | 12th March | Morocco, Tunisia                       | 2           |
| 5.3  | 15th March | 16th March | Morocco                               | 2           |
| 5.4  | 20th March | 24th March | Syria                                 | 8           |
| 5.5  | 28th March | 30th March | Morocco, Jordan                        | 2           |

**Bulgaria To Turkey**
BORDER VIOLENCE MONITORING NETWORK

BVMN is a volunteer led endeavor, acting as an alliance of organisations in the Western Balkans and Greece. BVMN is based on the efforts of participant organizations working in the field of documentation, media, advocacy and litigation. We finance the work through charitable grants and foundations, and are not in receipt of funds from any political organisation. The expenditures cover transport subsidies for volunteers in the field and four paid positions.

To follow more from the Border Violence Monitoring Network, check out our website for the entire testimony archive, previous monthly reports and regular news pieces. To follow us on social media, find us on Twitter handle @BorderViolence and on Facebook. For further information regarding this report or more on how to become involved please email us at mail@borderviolence.eu. For press and media requests please contact: press@borderviolence.eu